Monómeros Colombo-Venezolanos Sociedad Anónima (SA) is the largest fertilizer production company in Colombia, although it is a subsidiary of Petroquímica de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (SA). Currently, the company is in the process of being sold, which has sparked intense debate in political and economic circles. President Gustavo Petro has expressed his opposition to the transaction, but reports indicate that he has been aware of the negotiations for weeks. Both the Maduroregime and President Petro are well aware that Monómerosoperates under an OFAC license, having been sanctioned by the United States, which could be revoked by the incoming administration of President Donald Trump.
Reasons for the Sale
Pressure from the Maduro Regime: The Potential sale of Monómeros has been driven by Nicolás Maduro’s regime, which seeks to offload assets before Donald Trump takes office in the United States in January 2025. The Venezuelan regime is reportedly concerned about a potential intervention from the upcoming Trump administration through sanctions that would severely impact the company. Irregular Financial Transactions: It has been revealed that Monómeros made irregular payments to PEQUIVEN through a company in Hong Kong. Such transactions have raised suspicions about the legality of the company’s operations and its possible violation of the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government.
History of Sanctions
Monómeros has been under U.S. sanctions since 2017, limiting its ability to operate with banks and conduct commercial transactions. However, the previous administration under Juan Guaidó managed to suspend some sanctions, allowing the company to reactivate its operations.
Reaction from the Colombian Government
Statement from Gustavo Petro: President Petro has stated his opposition to the privatization of Monómeros, arguing that it could lead to increased fertilizer prices for Colombian farmers and create dependency on a foreign company.
Change of Position: Despite his opposition, Petro was informed about the negotiations and initially appeared to agree with the sale. His change in stance has created uncertainty regarding the relationship between Colombia and Venezuela. The shift in the U.S. presidency from a Biden administration to a Trump administration could compel President Petro to seek mediation through a restructuring that favors Colombia’s social interests.
Details of the Negotiation
Sales Agreement: Reports indicate that a preliminary agreement exists for the sale of Monómeros for over $300 million to a multinational interested in the agrochemical sector. This transaction could be one of the most significant in the region, but it must be noted that the United States would be involved in any negotiations concerning the future of this company.
Álex Nain Saab Morán: Saab, a well-known intermediary for the Maduro regime and current Minister of Industry and National Production in Venezuela, plays a crucial role in the negotiations. His experience in the sector could influence the course of the sale.
Implications for the Fertilizer Market: According to Monómeros, fertilizer production accounts for approximately 27.8 percent of the fertilizer market in Colombia, with plants in Barranquilla and Cartagena. Any change in its control could significantly impact the availability and prices of fertilizers in the country.
Implications of the Arrest of Taskin Torlak: A New Chapter in Venezuela’s Oil Crisis
The arrest of Taskin Torlak, a Turkish businessman and oil broker in Florida, represents a crucial event in the fight against corruption and oil smuggling in Venezuela. Accused of conspiring to transport sanctioned oil, his arrest highlights the complex networks of complicity surrounding the Venezuelan oil industry and underscores the intersection of international politics and illicit economics.
Connections with PDVSA and Context of Sanctions
Torlak was involved with Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) between 2020 and 2023, generating over $32 million through illegal oil exports. This case illustrates the effectiveness of evasion tactics employed to circumvent sanctions imposed by OFAC since January 2019, designed to undermine the Maduro‘s regime ability to monetize its resources.
Operational Tactics and Deception
Investigations reveal that Torlak and his accomplices implemented sophisticated methods to conceal the oil’s origin, such as frequently changing the names and flags of tankers and disabling tracking systems. This not only reflects their ingenuity in evading international scrutiny but also the lack of effective control within Venezuelan institutions, which have been dismantled by corruption.
Matthew Graves, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, has noted that Torlak’s actions demonstrate a pattern of deception allowing PDVSA operators to continue their illicit activities. His prosecution through U.S. financial institutions represents a serious violation of sanctions, with potential broader legal repercussions for those involved in this network.
Corruption Network of Tareck Zaidan El Aissami at PDVSA
Tareck El Aissami, former oil czar and former vice president of Venezuela, has been a central figure in the corruption scheme within PDVSA. His career is marked by multiple allegations of corruption, drug trafficking, and complicity in sanction evasion. El Aissami served as Minister of Oil from 2014 to 2017 and then as Vice President for the Economic Area until 2020.
Corruption Network and Key Collaborators
Irregular Agreements: During his tenure, El Aissami facilitated irregular agreements that allowed companies and close allies to obtain multimillion-dollar contracts for oil exports and the importation of goods. These contracts often lacked transparency and were awarded to companies linked to his inner circle.
Collaboration with Businessmen: El Aissami has been documented to have worked alongside businessmen like Alex Saab and other intermediaries facilitating oil smuggling and sanction evasion. These relationships have been key to maintaining the flow of illicit income to the regime.Resource Manipulation: El Aissami has also been accused of diverting resources from PDVSA to personal accounts and shell companies, enabling the embezzlement of funds intended for production and maintenance of oil infrastructure.
Protection for Drug Traffickers: Intelligence reports have indicated that El Aissami has had ties with drug trafficking groups, providing protection and facilitation for drug trafficking in exchange for financial and political support. This has increased violence and corruption in the country while reinforcing his power within the regime.
Arrests and Consequences: In April 2024, El Aissami was arrested for corruption, highlighting the deep governance crisis in Venezuela and the internal struggle for control of state resources. His downfall could trigger a domino effect among other corrupt officials in PDVSA and beyond.
Governments and Criminal Organizations Facilitating Sanction Violations
Several governments and criminal organizations have contributed to the evasion of sanctions imposed on the Maduro regime. Among them are:
Governments Facilitating Sanction Violations: Countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba have maintained commercial and political relations with Venezuela, offering support to Maduro’sregime. These countries often disregard international sanctions and have established agreements allowing the exchange of oil and other resources.
Criminal Organizations: Criminal groups in Venezuela, as well as in countries like Colombia, have actively participated in oil smuggling and sanction evasion. These organizations benefit from the situation by facilitating the trafficking of resources and illicit products.
Terrorist Groups: Organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas have shown interest in establishing ties with Maduro’s regime, using these connections to facilitate illicit operations. Additionally, groups like La Nueva Marquetalia, the Tren del Llano, and the Tren de Aragua have had connections with the regime, participating in drug trafficking and smuggling activities that mutually benefit these organizations and the Venezuelan government.Commercial Institutions: Companies in various countries have collaborated with Maduro’s regime in the illegal buying and selling of oil. These institutions often operate in the shadows, using networks of shell companies to conceal their involvement.
Banks: Some financial entities in allied countries have facilitated transactions that circumvent sanctions. These banks enable the movement of funds and money laundering, contributing to the sustainability of Maduro’s regime.
Ship Seizures for Sanction Evasion
Several vessels have been seized on various occasions for evading sanctions imposed on Maduro’s regime. Notable examples include: Vessel “Grace 1”: This oil tanker was detained in Gibraltar in July 2019 for evading EU sanctions. Although it was eventually released, the detention highlighted the actions of vessels transporting Venezuelan oil.
Vessel “Carmen”: In January 2020, U.S. authorities seized this vessel transporting Venezuelan oil to Cuba, highlighting the link between the two countries and the violation of sanctions. Vessel “Nicolas Maduro”: In March 2021, this vessel was detained by the U.S. Coast Guard for attempting to deliver oil to a country not authorized to receive it, demonstrating the ongoing challenge to sanctions.
Vessel “Boris”: This vessel was seized in December 2021 in Caribbean waters for transporting Venezuelan oil to an undisclosed destination. Its capture was part of a broader operation to curb oil smuggling.
Vessel “Carmen de Patagones”: This vessel, carrying Venezuelan crude, was detained in October 2022 in the Caribbean Sea. U.S. authorities stated that it was violating imposed sanctions.
A Strategic Approach to Dismantling Corruption
In a strategic sense, nations must implement a comprehensive approach that includes monitoring financial flows to identify, freeze, and confiscate assets obtained illicitly. This process should involve multiple government agencies, both nationally and internationally, to ensure a coordinated and effective response against corruption.
Moreover, it is crucial to leverage financial monitoring technologies and international cooperation to track money in real-time. This would not only help dismantle the criminal networks operating in Venezuela but also allow for the recovery of misappropriated assets that could be used to restore democracy and rebuild the country in the future. Collaboration with international organizations and the implementation of stricter sanctions against individuals and entities involved in corrupt activities are necessary steps to combat the cancer of corruption affecting Venezuelan society.
Interests: The Lobbying of Registered Agents Undermines the Purpose of Sanctions
Foreign agents registered in the United States who lobby on behalf of Monómeros undermine the intent of American sanctions against the Venezuelan regime. This investigation reveals how American lobbyists represent Monómeros and maintain direct contact with the U.S. government. In this particular case, documents including emails and publicly obtained records from the virtual electronic archives of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) evidence that former U.S. ambassador Otto Reich provided lobbying services for Monómeros. The signatures on these documents show his and Jorge Rodríguez’s signatures, dated May 22, 2022. Additionally, emails have been found between Otto Reich and U.S. Ambassador Brian Nichols, who acted as a lobbyist for Monómeros on June 29, 2022. There are also press articles reflecting Reich’s lobbying to discredit the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).
FARA Registration Application:
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/7116-Exhibit-AB-20220511-1.pdf
FARA Emails Between Otto Reich and Brian Nichols:
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/7116-Informational-Materials-20220706-1.pdf
Political Context and Consequences
Torlak’s arrest occurs in a volatile political environment. While the Biden administration has granted licenses to some U.S. oil companies to temporarily operate with PDVSA, Trump’s reelection could mean new sanctions, especially in response to allegations of electoral fraud in Venezuela. This climate of uncertainty could exacerbate the economic crisis in the country, forcing Maduro’s regime to rely even more on intermediaries and illicit activities to sustain its government.
Conclusions and Future Perspectives
The sale of Monómeros is a sensitive issue that reflects the complex political and economic relationships between Colombia and Venezuela, as well as Maduro’s regime tactics to evade sanctions. As negotiations progresses and with the recent arrest of Torlak, the decisions made will not only affect the parties involved but will also have repercussions on the Colombian agricultural market and the bilateral relationship between both countries. Against the backdrop of potential sanctions and political changes, the future of Monómeros and the Venezuelan economy remains uncertain. Alternatively, there may be a solution favorable to Colombia and Monómeros through intermediaries like American ambassador Otto Reich or other Americans who favor interests rather than the new administration of President Donald Trump. The intersection of politics, economics, and corruption in Venezuela poses significant challenges for both the international community and the future of the country. Ultimately, we will see the resolution of this issue driven by social interests led by a new administration.
Credits:
This information has been compiled and developed based on reports from media outlets such as El Colombiano, Insight Crime, Semana, El Tiempo, La Nación, and La República, among others, which have provided an in-depth analysis of the current situation in Venezuela and its implications in the region. Additionally, online resources from U.S. agencies including OFAC, the Department of Justice, and emails between Otto Reich and Brian Nichols, as well as FARA regarding Monómeros, were used.
by William Acosta, NYPD (Ret) e Jesús D. Romero, USN (Ret)
