Europe’s Real Temptation
Europe does not”celebrate ” over Iran: it especially “celebrates” at seeing Trump denied by the real.
Official Europe, and official France, are not ‘pro-Iranian’. Public texts even say the opposite. Paris repeats that France had ‘not chosen this war’, that it did not participate in it and that its posture was ‘strictly defensive’. At the same time, France, Germany and the United Kingdom condemned the Iranian strikes against the countries of the region, and reaffirmed that Iran should never have access to nuclear weapons.
And yet, there does exist, in part of the European and French commentary, a form of discreet satisfaction at seeing Donald Trump entangled in a conflict that he is unable to resolve quickly. This satisfaction is not an accession to Tehran. It is something else: a mix of anti-Trumpism, fatigue with regard to the American wars, resentment against Washington’s unilateralism, and an anti-Israel tropism that has become so deep that it ends up distorting the reading of the Iranian file. In other words, it is not so much Iran that a part of Europe loves; it is the spectacle of an upset, slowed, denied America.
The real topic: Trump, not Iran
This is where the heart of the problem lies. For part of the European elites, Donald Trump is not simply an American president. He embodies a brutal, solitary America, humiliating its allies, unconcerned about consultation, and convinced that force can impose a solution. When this America encounters reality, many see it as a confirmation of their theses. (Reuters reports that several European leaders refused to follow Washington because they had not been consulted, did not understand the war objectives, and considered the conflict politically toxic in their countries).
From then on, among some experts, the American stalemate produces a kind of intellectual satisfaction. Why? Because it validates a twenty-year-old software: Iraq, Afghanistan, then now Iran. Same supposed mechanics: underestimation of the terrain, unclear objectives, then difficulty in concluding. What some people are enjoying is not the Iranian response as such. It’s the fact that Trump cannot turn war into a quick, clean, spectacular victory. Clearly: less a pro-Iranian joy than an American anti-hubris pleasure.
The European narrative shift
By wanting to punish Donald Trump in the narrative, some commentators end up mitigating Iran’s responsibility. This is where the slide is dangerous. For the official European positions remain clear: they condemn the Iranian strikes, recall the danger of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic program, and also condemn the regime’s repression against its own population. Yet, in the media space, another music is heard: Iran becomes a ‘reactive’ actor for some, almost secondary, as if the sole source of disorder were Washington, or Washington with Israel. This shift of blame does not formally whitewash Tehran, but it de facto produces a more lenient climate towards it.
It is also found among more institutional military or geopolitical experts, but in another form: not militant ideology, rather a form of disillusioned realism, sometimes tinged with European pride. The implicit idea becomes: «We had told you well. You wanted to act alone. Here you are trapped.» Again, the psychological target is not Iran; it’s Trump America.
Official Europe does not rejoice over Iran; a part of the European intellectual ecosystem especially rejoices at seeing Donald Trump fail to impose the tempo, the narrative and the solution. It’s not quite the same thing, but the political effect can be similar. Because when we so much prefer to see America humiliated, we sometimes end up underestimating the nature of the Iranian regime. This is the true European blindness: not loving Iran, but hating to the point of losing in clarity those who fight it.
