The myth that U.S. sanctions can facilitate China’s advance in Latin America.
Introduction
In recent years, the idea has been promoted that certain U.S. policies have directly or indirectly enabled China’s expansion in Latin America (Americas Quarterly, 2019). However, this phenomenon requires a more comprehensive analysis that considers not only the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China in the region, but also the autonomy of Latin American countries and changes in the global economy (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016).
Contradictions in U.S. Policy and Opportunities for China
Recent U.S. policies, such as the imposition of tariffs and pressure on traditional allies, have generated discontent in the region (Faiola, 2025). This perception, driven from the White House, has been leveraged by Beijing as part of its global expansion strategy (Baptista, Cash & Lee, 2025). China offers trade and investment without political conditions, which is highly attractive to many Latin American governments (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). The bellicose rhetoric and lack of a clear strategy from Washington have led several Latin American countries to diversify their international relations and seek new partners, such as China (GIS Reports, 2025).
The Phenomenon of Regional Multi-Alignment
A significant number of Latin American countries have adopted a clear policy: not to choose between Washington and Beijing, but to pursue a strategy of multi-alignment (Atlantic Council, 2025). This approach allows countries to maximize the benefits of engaging with both major actors. This trend is discussed in Brian Winter’s recent book, The Dark Side of Pimping: Nicaragua and the Latin American Countries that Maintain Relations with Beijing, which offers deep reflections on the subject (Winter, 2025).
Limitations of the U.S. Deterrence Strategy
The U.S. tactic of setting “red lines” to curb Chinese penetration has had limited effectiveness (Rouvinski, 2025). While there have been some successes, such as Panama’s withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative, Washington’s pressure has not managed to contain Beijing’s efforts to achieve a deeper and more solid presence in the region, where China continues to invest and sign strategic agreements (Jütten, 2025). In contrast, China’s long-term policy has already secured a strengthened presence in strategic sectors (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016).
Structural Factors: The Relative Decline of U.S. Hegemony
China’s growing presence in Latin America is not solely due to U.S. policy missteps; rather, it responds to structural opportunities seized by countries in the region (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016). Since 2000, Chinese investment has grown at a much faster rate than that of other external actors, surpassing the European Union and Japan in many sectors (Jütten, 2025). Among the reasons for this phenomenon are the diversification of investment sources, China’s massive demand for raw materials, and access to virtually unlimited financing, often without the political conditions that typically accompany other sources of funding (Americas Quarterly, 2019).
Threat or Complement? The Perspective of the U.S. and the Region
China’s presence does not directly threaten the United States, but it does raise concerns in areas such as critical infrastructure, technology, and strategic resources (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). If there is any potential for dual use, it would be in infrastructure, a sector where China could leverage its assets in a conflict scenario. The same applies to technology and strategic resources (Rouvinski, 2025).
Strategic Intelligence: Implications and Scenarios
Risks for the U.S.:
•Less control over key areas and international organizations (Atlantic Council, 2025).
•Opaque commercial practices in the region that could expose the U.S. to various risks (Baptista, Cash & Lee, 2025).
•Potential use of Chinese-built infrastructure against U.S. interests in a worst-case scenario (GIS Reports, 2025).
Opportunities for Latin America:
•More diverse sources of financing and technology (Americas Quarterly, 2019).
•A much broader diplomatic maneuvering space (Atlantic Council, 2025).
•Improved negotiating conditions with both the U.S. and China (Jütten, 2025).
Challenges for China:
•Addressing local and external distrust and criticism regarding labor rights, environmental protection, transparency, and alleged espionage links (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023).
•Avoiding overexposure that could provoke punitive measures from the U.S. and its allies (Faiola, 2025).
Conclusions
The myth that U.S. actions are the main facilitator of China’s advance in Latin America oversimplifies a highly complex reality. Certain U.S. policies can, of course, give a push to China’s arrival, but the Asian giant’s growth in the region has many other ingredients (Americas Quarterly, 2019; Winter, 2025). Chief among them is the strong and clear interest of many Latin American governments in forging alliances and developing relations with China, regardless of their democratic shortcomings (Armony, Dussel Peters & Cui, 2016). So, what is this myth really about? What do U.S. policies say or fail to say about it? It’s not just about competing with China, which has already been labeled in many ways. The issue is much more complex: offering Latin America and the Caribbean, amid the deterioration of regional bilateral relations, something that can counterbalance the appeal of cooperation offered by Beijing (Rouvinski, 2025). Therefore, what Washington needs to do is not just visit the region, but also offer the “good life” that is increasingly difficult to achieve in a divided world (Faiola, 2025).
by:William L. Acosta: Retired NYPD officer and founder/CEO of Equalizer Private Investigations & Security Services Inc.
References
•Americas Quarterly. (2019, August 15). China and Latin America 2.0: What the Next Phase Will Look Like.
•Armony, A. C., Dussel Peters, E., & Cui, S. (2016). China builds the road to a new era in Latin America and the Caribbean: Infrastructure projects and their impact. University of Pittsburgh.
•Atlantic Council. (2025, May 15). Four questions (and expert answers) about the China-Latin America summit.
•Baptista, E., Cash, J., & Lee, L. (2025, May 13). China suggests it can compete with U.S. influence in Latin America and the Caribbean by providing billions in investment and development. Reuters.
•Council on Foreign Relations. (2023, January 10). The growing influence of China in Latin America.
•Faiola, A. (2025, May 12). Following Trump’s trade policies, China seeks to ally with Lula and win over Latin America. The New York Times.
•GIS Reports. (2025, May 20). Latin America sandwiched between the U.S. and China.
•Jütten, M. (2025, February). China’s growing presence in Latin America: What it means for the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service.
•Rouvinski, V. (2025, May 13). Tariff cause of concern? In its courtship with Latin America, China is unveiling an alternative to the United States. Deutsche Welle.
•Winter, B. (2025, May 15). China Doubles Down on Latin America. Americas Quarterly.
